The Great Financial Crisis coincided with a sizable reduction in global external imbalances, defined as the absolute value of the sum of individual country current account surpluses and deficits relative to global GDP. Although current account balances should not respond to a downturn that is uniform across countries, one that hits countries with current account deficits harder than those with surpluses might result in a decline in the global balance. This paper quantifies the cyclical portion of the current account balance for 35 countries using estimates of the severity of the cycle in each country relative to that of its trading partners in conjunction with three estimates of the sensitivity of the current account balance to changes in the output gap. Two of the estimates are derived from equations linking trade to income and the third is derived from the relationship between changes in current account balances and changes in output gap differentials. The main result is that the bulk of the reduction in the global current account imbalance since 2006 appears to have been structural. Cyclical forces are estimated to account for between 10 and 30 percent of the decline. In the aggregate, the cyclical effect is estimated to be currently holding down the global current account balance by about ½ percentage point. However, the size of the cyclical effect is more substantial for some countries. Both surplus and deficit countries have contributed to the decline in the absolute value of the global current account imbalance, but the contribution of the deficit countries is about twice as large as that of the surplus countries. Changes in oil prices have had largely offsetting effects on the global current account balance, but changes in real exchange rates in recent years have contributed to the reduction.
I. Introduction
Whether it was causation or simple correlation, the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) that began in late 2007 has coincided with a sizable reduction in global external imbalances, defined as the absolute value of the sum of individual country current account surpluses and deficits relative to global GDP. As shown in Figure 1 , the sum of the absolute value of global surpluses and deficits for 35 countries that make up most of global trade has fallen from a peak of about 5¼ percent of GDP in the third quarter of 2006, shortly before the crisis began, to a current level around 3 percent. This decline has been accompanied by a swing in the estimated global output gap from 2½ percent in late 2007 to a low of -3¾ percent in early 2009, followed by a rebound to -1½ percent near the end of 2013. Source: See Appendix Could the two be related? Should global current account balances shrink in periods of widespread economic weakness? For most countries, the largest part of the current account balance is the trade balance. When a single country experiences a cyclical downturn, its current account balance is expected to improve along with its trade balance because its imports shrink while its exports are not affected. However, when many countries simultaneously experience economic weakness, both exports and imports for each country will contract. Whether there is an impact on the current account of an individual country depends to a large extent on the severity of its own downturn relative to those of its trading partners. A country that experiences a more severe recession than its trading partners should see a cyclical improvement in its trade, and thus, its current account balance in a global recession as its imports fall more than its exports, and vice versa.
Whether a global recession translates into a reduction and/or an increase in the global current account imbalance will depend on the size and direction of the cyclical effect in surplus countries compared with deficit countries. If the recession is more severe, on average, in countries that have current account deficits and less severe in those that have surpluses, global imbalances should shrink. In contrast, if deficit countries experience less severe recessions than surplus countries, global imbalances could widen.
One reason the GFC may have contributed to a reduction in global imbalances is that some of the larger deficit countries (notably the United States) experienced a deeper recession than the average, while some of the larger surplus countries (notably China) experienced a milder slump (figure 2), as evidenced by differences in the deviations of actual output from estimated potential. The recovery to date also has been uneven, with stronger recoveries in emerging markets on average than in advanced economies. This may also have contributed to differential cyclical effects on current accounts.
Source: See Appendix
In order to separate cyclical from structural changes, we need to isolate the portion of the current account balance that depends on the cycle. Quantifying the cyclical portion of the current account balance requires two pieces of information:
(1) the severity of the cycle in each country, which is usually measured as the extent to which actual output deviates from its potential (output gap) for each country. The relative severity of each country's cycle can be measured as the difference between its own output gap and that of a weighted average of its trading partners.
(2) the sensitivity of the current account balance to changes in the output gap. This should be related to the elasticity of exports and imports to trading partner and home country GDP, respectively.
As detailed in the appendix, output gaps for each country were derived using actual GDP data from country sources along with potential output from the IMF WEO for the advanced economies and from HP filters for the emerging economies. Tradingpartner output gaps were calculated for each country by combining the output gaps of its trading partners using bilateral export weights.
Three estimates of the sensitivity of the current account balance to relative changes in output gaps were derived using panel regressions. The first uses an estimate of the long-run, or trend, trade elasticity from co-integrating relationships between trade and income, multiplied by the share of trade in output in each country. The estimated income elasticity is about 1.8 for both exports and imports, well in line with results from the literature. However, because the cyclical response of trade to income may be greater than the long-run response, as discussed in Haltmaier (2011) , the long-run elasticity may underestimate the response of trade to the output gap. Therefore, an estimate of the short-run, or cyclical elasticity was calculated by using the method of Vahid and Engle (1993) . This estimated elasticity, which was about 3.3 for both exports and imports, also was multiplied by the trade share to provide a second estimate of the cyclical effect.
These two estimates might be expected to bracket the cyclical effect based on trade elasticities.
The third estimate comes from a panel regression of changes in the current account balance on changes in the difference in the output gap between the home country and its trading partners, along with other variables likely to affect short-run movements in the current account. The coefficient on the output gap differential provides a direct estimate of the cyclical sensitivity of the current account balance. This estimated coefficient (adjusted for the presence of the lagged dependent variable in the regression) is a little less than .3, suggesting that an output gap differential of 1 percentage point should raise or lower a country's current account balance by .3 percentage point on average.
The next section describes in more detail the methods used to derive the sensitivity of the current balance to the output gap differential. The third section presents the various estimates of the cyclically-adjusted current balances. Section IV looks at other factors that may have influenced global current account imbalances and section V provides some detail by country. The final section concludes.
II. Methodology

A. Trade Shares and Elasticities
For most countries, trade comprises the lion's share of the current account. If we assume that cyclical changes in the current account balance are dominated by changes in the trade balance, we can write the change as: This relationship can be rewritten as:
(2) Δ(TB/GDP) = εX * xshare * ΔTPGDP/TPGDP -εM * mshare * ΔGDP/GDP where εX and εM are the elasticities of exports to trading partner GDP and imports to home country GDP, respectively, and xshare and mshare are export and import shares of GDP.
The portion of the change in the trade balance (and by extension, in the current account) that is a result of cyclical changes in GDP can then be calculated as:
(3) (ΔTB/ΔGDP)cyc = εX * xshare * TPGAP -εM * mshare * GAP where TPGAP and GAP are the trading-partner and home-country output gaps, respectively.
If we assume that the elasticities of exports and imports as well as the shares of exports and imports in GDP are approximately equal on average, this expression can be further simplified to:
where εT is the average trade elasticity and tshare is the average of the export and import shares of GDP. The cyclical portion of the trade balance is thus measured as the average trade elasticity multiplied by the share of trade multiplied by the difference between a weighted average of each country's trading partners' output gaps and its own output gap.
The cyclically-adjusted trade balance is the difference between the actual trade balance and the cyclical portion.
To make this calculation we need an estimate of the trade elasticity, i.e., the responsiveness of trade to changes in output. The rapid growth in world trade relative to GDP (chart 3) suggests that this elasticity is greater than 1 and in fact most studies have found a long-run elasticity of trade to income of between 1 and 2. Furthermore, as evidenced by the sharp drop in the ratio in the GFC and as explored in Haltmaier (2011) , the cyclical elasticity of trade may well be larger than its trend elasticity. This result may reflect the greater proportion of goods compared with services in trade relative to GDP, given that consumption and production of goods tend to be more cyclically sensitive than consumption and production of services. Thus, using the long-run or trend elasticity may understate the extent to which the current account balance depends on the cycle.
To allow for this possibility, both long-run and short-run trade elasticities were estimated using a two-step procedure that first estimates the co-integrating relationship among exports/imports and trading partner GDP/own GDP in order to uncover the longrun elasticity. Following the methodology of Vahid and Engle, as described more fully in Haltmaier (2011) , the short-term or cyclical relationship is then estimated by regressing the change in exports/imports on the change in GDP using GMM with the lagged values of the variables and the error correction term from the co-integrating relationship as instruments.
Source: See Appendix
As shown in table 1, Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics for individual unit root processes indicate that exports, imports, trading partner GDP, and own-country GDP all have unit roots. Since trade is also likely to depend on the real exchange rate, this variable also was evaluated for a unit root. However, the real exchange rate appears to be stationary in levels (other tests for unit roots provided similar results). Pedroni residual cointegration tests with automatic lag length selection suggest the existence of cointegrating relationships between both exports and trading partner GDP and imports and own-country GDP (table 2), as 7 of the 11 statistics are significant at the 5 percent level for exports and all are significant for imports. Cointegrating equations were estimated for both exports and imports in panel regressions that used data for the 32 countries for which data on total real exports and imports are available. The results from the estimation of the cointegrating equations are shown in table 3. The long-run income elasticities for exports and imports are quite similar at 1.84 for exports and 1.72 for imports. The analysis uses an average of the two, 1.78, as the long-run trade elasticity.
The results from the estimate of the cyclical relationship between exports/imports and real GDP are shown in the lower part of table 3. The change in real exchange rates also was included in this equation. The estimated short-run elasticties are again very similar for exports and imports at about 3.3. The real exchange rate elasticity was -.58
for exports and only .23 for imports, which appears to be implausibly low (these results do not satisfy the Marshall-Lerner condition). However, the estimated income elasticities are very similar when the exchange rate is not included in the equation. 
B. Direct Estimation of Effects of Output Gaps on Current Account Balances
The substantial literature linking current account balances to economic variables has generally focused on long-term structural determinants, including demographics, changes in the output gap differential (trading partner output gap minus home-country output gap), changes in the log of the real exchange rate, and changes in the log of oil prices multiplied by a dummy variable for whether a country is an oil exporter or importer. Four lags of the current account balance also were included.
The reason that the differential between the trading partner and home-country output gap was used rather than the two series separately is that they are highly correlated over time, making it difficult to obtain separate estimates of the effect on the current account balance.
The results of the panel regression are shown in table 4. All of the variables are correctly signed and highly significant. A one-percentage point increase in the output gap differential improves the current account balance by .28 percentage points on average. An increase (appreciation) in the real exchange rate reduces the current account balance. An increase in oil prices reduces the current account balance for oil importers and raises it for oil exporters. 
III. Cyclically Adjusted Current Account Balances
The cyclical portion of the current account balance was calculated by combining the sensitivities derived using the methodologies described in the previous section along with the estimated gaps. The cyclically adjusted balance is the difference between the actual balance and the cyclical portion, i.e.
(5) CABcyc = Si * (TPGAP -GAP)
where Si is the estimated sensitivity. Thus, all of the methods suggest that a larger portion of the decline in the global current account balance since before the GFC has been structural than cyclical, particularly in the earlier part of the period. However, the unevenness of the recovery contributed to a more substantial cyclical effect that peaked in 2011 and has now dropped back as the recovery has become more even.
Source: See Appendix
IV. Other Influences on the Global Current Account Balance
If more than half of the decline in the global current account balance since the onset of the GFC cannot be explained by cyclical factors, can we identify other influences that might have played some role? The panel equation used to identify the direct effect of the cycle on the current account also includes both the price of oil and the real exchange rate, providing an avenue to assess the effects of these variables on global current account imbalances.
Oil Prices
The price of oil fell by about 40 percent between the third quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of 2009 (figure 6). However, it later more than recouped that decline, suggesting that whatever effect the fall in prices might have had on global current account imbalances was reversed during the recovery period. Table 5 shows the aggregate current account deficits of a number of individual countries as a percent of their aggregated GDP, along with a decomposition into cyclical and secular components using the sensitivity based on the cyclical trade elasticity. This measure gives the largest estimate of the cyclical effect; results from the other methods would be about half this size on average, although the effects differ across countries. The table also includes the output gap differential that is responsible for the cyclical effect, defined as the weighted-average trading partner output gap minus the own-country gap.
V. Current Account Balances by Country
Thus, a positive differential should have a positive effect on the current account balance and vice versa. The balances are shown separately for the four countries that had the largest surpluses and deficits in U.S. dollars in the third quarter of 2006 and for the remainder of each group. This suggests that some of these gains may be reversed as the global recovery broadens and deepens. In contrast, the contribution of the Chinese surplus dropped by more than half to a little under 0.3 percent of GDP. The cyclical component accounted for about a third of the decline, reflecting China's relatively strong performance during the GFC. However, as the Chinese economy has slowed and those of some of its trading partners have improved, its output gap differential, which reached a low of -4.7 percent 2009, has moved closer to zero, and the cyclical portion of its current account surplus has fallen accordingly. Japan also saw a sharp reduction in its current account surplus over this period to near zero. Most of the decline appears to have been structural rather than cyclical, as the adjusted balance fell by 0.3 percent of global GDP. Table 6 shows the contributions of oil prices and exchange rates to the changes in the current account balances for the same groups of countries over the 2006-2013 period.
The rise in oil prices contributed to a widening of over $100 billion on net for the deficit countries, with the United States accounting for the lion's share of the change. Oil prices also are negative on net for the surplus countries (the sample does not include some of the larger oil exporters, notably Saudi Arabia and Russia). As a result, the overall effect on global imbalances is small. 
VI. Conclusion
The results of the preceding analysis suggest that cyclical differences have played some role in changes in current account balances since the start of the GFC, but the effect differs considerably across countries, and they do not explain the bulk of the considerable reduction in the global current account imbalance over that period. Similarly, changes in oil prices have been important for some countries, but largely offset for the aggregate.
Changes in exchange rates have, however, contributed to the overall reduction in imbalances.
The cyclical effect at the end of the sample period in 2013 was estimated to be a little less than ½ percent of aggregate GDP for both surplus and deficit countries, suggesting that some of the decline in imbalances since 2006 may be partially reversed as the global economy continues to normalize. However, this analysis still leaves a considerable amount of the reduction in imbalances unexplained. In particular, none of the variables considered here can explain the very sharp reduction in imbalances that occurred between the onset of the GFC and its trough. This leaves open the possibility that the analysis is not capturing the full cyclical effect and that there could be a more substantial reversal than this analysis would suggest as the global recovery continues.
